Contraception, abortion and state socialism: categories in birth control discourses and policies by Stenvoll, Dag
 33
Dag Stenvoll*
1
＊	 Researcher, Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies (Norway), Visiting Scholar at Kansai University in 
2006.
	 	 	 This	 article	was	prepared	 for	 the	20th	 IPSA	World	Congress,	Fukuoka,	 July	9−13,	 2006.	 I	want	 to	 thank	
Dorothy McBride for valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.
Contraception, Abortion and State Socialism: 
Categories in Birth Control Discourses and Policies
 Dag STENVOLL*
Abstract
 The article is about the politics of birth control in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
I will map abortion and contraception policies and discourses during and after state 
socialism, with Russia, Poland and Romania as main cases. Furthermore, historical and 
contemporary constructions of birth control in these countries are contrasted to western 
European debates, in order to denaturalise implicit assumptions in the different contexts. 
The analytical focus will in particular be on the conceptual distinction between contraception 
and abortion and on different normative assessments of these two categories, with examples 
from	 ‘border	 conflicts’	–	 controversies	on	whether	 a	phenomenon	 is	 the	one	or	 the	other.	
The	 rhetoric	 of	 ‘choice’	 in	 abortion	 debates	 and	 its	 implicit	 assumptions	 will	 also	 be	
discussed.
Introduction
 A normative distinction between contraception and abortion structures most western 
European	 countries’	 birth	 control	 politics	 and	 discourses.	 Contraception	 is	 approached	 as	
responsible and as a legitimate way to prevent childbirth; abortion as either a necessary 
evil, for when contraception fails or when there is some other special circumstance making 
the	individual	pregnancy	‘abortable’,	or	as	simply	an	evil,	not	legitimate	under	any	(or	only	
few) circumstances. Those against easy abortion access rarely argue against modern 
contraceptives as such (except marginal groups), and those in favour rarely argue that 
abortion is unproblematic, something that should be used as primary method to avoid 
childbirth	(to	be	‘used	as	contraception’).
 This different normative stance to contraception and abortion in contemporary Western 
Europe is not universal, and to make some of the hidden assumptions of this particular 
problematisation of birth control clearer, I will in the following review birth control policies 
and discourses in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Under state socialism, birth control 
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policy was not based on a normative distinction between contraception as responsible and 
legitimate and abortion as a (necessary) evil. Abortion on request became policy before 
modern contraceptives were invented or mass-produced, and abortion became the primary 
method of birth control (Stloukal 1999). Contraceptives, especially those for women 
(intrauterine	 devices,	 or	 IUDs,	 and	 the	 pill),	 were	 seen	 as	 unnatural,	 inefficient	 and/or	
dangerous. Information on modern contraceptives was not spread by the authorities, and 
they were in general not available. Scholars have commented on the high abortion and low 
contraception levels compared to most other industrialised countries, and on the lack of a 
normative	abortion	debate	opposing	foetal	and	women’s	rights	(Kon	1993).
	 In	 the	 first	 part	 of	 this	 article,	 I	 will	 explore	 contraception	 and	 abortion	 politics	 in	
Russia, Poland and Romania during and after state socialism. I will discuss what the 
differences between these countries are and what they have in common, what distinguishes 
them from most western European countries regarding current and historical birth control 
policies, and how their birth control policies have been affected by the fall of state 
socialism.	 In	 the	 second	 part,	 I	 will	 in	 particular	 discuss	 the	 intersection	 or	 ‘borderland’	
between contraception and abortion: Whether a particular phenomenon or technology (like 
IUDs, morning after pills or menstrual extraction) should be categorised as contraception 
or as abortion, and what the consequences are for policy. I will also discuss the implicit 
assumptions	 which	 often	 underlie	 ‘choice	 rhetoric’	 in	 birth	 control	 debates,	 and	 identify	
what I see as the inherent contradictions of such rhetoric.
 Through the historical comparisons across countries and regions, and by looking at 
some grey areas between contraception and abortion, I will try to denaturalise political 
problematisations of birth control in different contexts. The aim of the article is not to rank 
countries	or	policies	by	some	measure	of	progress,	but	 to	 reflect	on	 the	different	ways	of	
problematising birth control, and to identify some underlying and often implicit assumptions 
that may have important effects on policy choices and reproductive rights. Different ways 
of	 constructing	 the	 field	 of	 birth	 control	 correspond	 to	 different	 ideas	 about	 state	 and	
society. The article will discuss how policies in this area are used as political tools to 
address state concerns - e.g. to encourage or counter population growth, to decrease or 
increase gender differences, or to establish individuals or families as primary units of 
society.
Birth Control in Central and Eastern Europe During and After State 
Socialism
	 The	Soviet	Union	 introduced	abortion	on	 request	 in	1920,	 as	 the	first	 country	 in	 the	
world.	After	 a	 period	of	 re-criminalisation	 from	 the	mid-1930s,	 abortion	was	 again	made	
available	on	request	in	1955,	after	Stalin’s	death.	Many	of	the	other	state	socialist	countries	
followed, either right away (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland and Hungary) or 
more gradually (Yugoslavia and GDR). Thus in the USSR and most CEE countries, 
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abortion became easily available prior to modern contraceptives. Only in Hungary and in 
East Germany were modern contraceptives such as the pill and IUDs used to a noteworthy 
extent, from the 1970s (Zielinska 1987)1）. During the 1960s and 1970s, when there was a 
steep rise in the use of IUDs and contraceptive pills in Western Europe and North America, 
most CEE regimes directly or indirectly encouraged abortion over contraception as a means 
for	 birth	 control.	 The	 latter	 was	 spoken	 of	 as	 more	 ‘unnatural’	 than	 the	 former	 and	 as	
potentially dangerous for women (Kulczycki 1999)2）. Abortion has been much more 
common than in Western Europe and North America, and only a few other industrialised 
countries (among them Japan) have had similar abortion rates (Stloukal 1999).
 After the systemic and social changes around 1990, reliance on abortion as the primary 
form	 of	 birth	 control	 is	 still	 widespread.	 Despite	 political	 conflict	 around	 the	 issue	 in	
countries such as Hungary, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and the 
GDR, abortion policies have remained relatively permissive (Kulczycki 1999, Flood 2002). 
In countries with restrictive abortion regimes prior to transition, such as Romania, Bulgaria 
and Albania, laws have been liberalised. The exception is Poland, where strong and 
enduring	political	conflict	during	 the	1990s	 lead	 to	a	 restrictive	birth	control	 regime,	both	
compared to previously in Poland and to the whole of Europe (with the exception of 
Ireland).
 Despite uncertainty as to the actual numbers of abortions during the state socialist 
regimes, the trend since 1990 has clearly been towards fewer abortions, both in real 
numbers, in relation to the number of women of reproductive age (abortion rate), and in 
relation to the number of live births (abortion ratio). So, despite a decline in the number of 
births, the number of abortions has fallen even more. In most CEE countries, and especially 
in Russia and Romania, the prevalence of abortion is still high above the rest of the world. 
In	2004,	the	estimated	abortion	ratio	in	Russia	was	about	five	times	higher	than	the	rate	in	
an	 average	western	 European	 country	 such	 as	Norway:	 130	 versus	 25	 abortions	 per	 100	
live births.
	 Today’s	 CEE	 birth	 control	 politics	 are	 partly	 leftovers	 from	 the	 way	 preventing	
childbirth was problematised and dealt with under state socialism. The selected cases, 
Russia, Poland and Romania represent three historical birth control policy patterns during 
and after state socialism. Russia is the prototypical CEE country, with its continued 
permissive policy since the mid-1950s favouring abortion over contraception. Poland and 
Romania have both been described as exceptional for CEE; Poland with its change from 
permissive policy under state socialism to restrictive policy after transition, and Romania 
from restrictive policy under state socialism (after a period of permissive policy in the late 
　） Hungary also had a relatively restrictive abortion law compared to most CEE countries, with a committee 
system	–	women	seeking	abortions	had	to	justify	themselves	before	a	medical	committee	(Scheppele	1996).
　）	 This	 is	 also	 a	well-known	 perspective	 on	 ‘artificial’	 contraception	 in	 the	west.	 Especially	 the	 pill	 has,	 in	
recent	times,	been	discussed	as	potentially	harmful	to	the	user’s	health	–	although	there	have	also	been	claims	
of the opposite.
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1950s and early 1960s) to permissive policy after the fall of the Ceausescu regime in 1989. 
Studying birth control politics comparatively under and after state socialism through these 
three cases will provide contrasts to gain analytical distance to abortion politics in other 
contexts, and help to uncover implicit assumptions of (to denaturalise) different national 
debates.
Russia
 According to classic Marxist and Leninist ideology, abortion is a social ill created by 
the capitalist system of production. The Russian revolutionaries wanted to abolish restrictive 
birth control policy, and argued that abortion would gradually disappear in the new Soviet 
society,	because	 there	would	be	no	more	need	 for	 them	(Lenin	1913).	 In	1920	a	 law	was	
enacted, according to which abortions would be done free of charge by doctors in public 
hospitals. It criminalized non-doctors performing the operation (thus depriving midwives of 
their	right	to	practice)	and	abortions	performed	in	private,	for	profit.	Abortion	was	still	seen	
as	 an	 evil	 –	 although	 a	 necessary	 evil,	 due	 to	 remains	 of	 bourgeois	 social	 structure	 and	
family patterns.
 Soviet women continued having abortions, despite the fall of capitalism. Initially the 
procedure was free for all, but during the 1920s the guidelines for performing abortions 
changed so that some women had to pay for the operation themselves. Time limits were 
also imposed (three months, except in cases where continued pregnancy threatened the life 
of the woman), and a minimum of six months prescribed between consecutive abortions. 
From 1928, women were obliged to stay hospitalized for three days after terminating their 
pregnancy	(Zielinska	1987).	In	1936,	abortion	was	re-criminalized	by	the	pro-natalist	Stalin	
regime,	 except	 for	when	 the	mother’s	 life	 or	 health	was	 in	 danger,	 or	 in	 cases	 of	 serious	
inheritable disorders. According to the law proposal, abortion was no longer necessary, 
since capitalist repression had ended. Women had achieved full equality of rights, it was 
argued, and could therefore ‘fulfil the great and responsible duty of giving birth to and 
bringing up a new generation without fearing the future’	 (quoted	in	Zielinska	1987:	253).	
It was also argued that abortions posed great health risks for women, and should therefore 
be banned.
 Until the late 1920s, contraception and family planning had been encouraged and 
studied	(Kon	1995),	but	this	also	ended	under	Stalin’s	pro-natalism.	After	his	death	in	1953,	
family legislation in general became more similar to the 1920s. In 1955, the abortion ban 
was repealed. It was now argued that decriminalization would reduce the number of illegal 
abortions,	which	were	harmful	to	women’s	health	(thus,	much	the	same	medical	argument	
as in western European debates on legalisation at the time). Abortion was to be reduced 
through other means than criminal law, especially through social security programs and 
education/propaganda.	According	 to	 Zielinska	 (1987),	 the	 preamble	 to	 the	 revision	 also	
included	 a	proclaimed	aim	of	 ‘great	 ideological	 significance’,	 namely	 that	women	 should	
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have the right to decide individually about motherhood.
 Information about and supply of contraceptives were near-absent in the USSR, and 
from 1974, the use of contraceptive pills was effectively banned (United Nations 2002). 
The early introduction of abortion on request, combined with a lack of contraceptive means 
and information for most Soviet women, caused abortion to become the main method of 
controlling childbirth. Based on several estimations it seems that the Soviet abortion level 
was	the	highest	in	the	world,	with	the	possible	exception	of	Romania	(Remennick	1993).
 Connected to the high prevalence of abortion, the relationship between contraception 
and	abortion	was	understood	differently	 than	 in	 today’s	Western	Europe.	 In	 the	USSR,	as	
well as in most of the other CEE state socialist countries, abortion was treated by the 
authorities as a relatively acceptable form of birth control, while contraception was regarded 
as	 unnatural,	 inefficient	 and/or	 dangerous.	 In	 the	 early	 1990s,	 induced	 abortion	 had	 for	
decades been ‘perceived as a routine, although certainly unpleasant, medical procedure, 
comparable, say, to the removal of a tooth. This is combined with an ultra-cautious attitude 
towards contraception in general, which is viewed as something “unnatural” (in most cases 
this has nothing to do with religious beliefs)’	 (Remennick	 1993:	 53).	 The	 dominant	
problematisation of abortion has thus had a different focus than in Western Europe: Not on 
foetal	rights	versus	women’s	reproductive	choices,	but	on	the	commonly	very	unsatisfactory	
conditions around the performance of abortions in public hospitals (lack of hygiene and 
anaesthetics, for instance). In the words of sociologist Larissa Lissyutkina, Russian women 
‘do not have to fight for free abortion but for its humanization’	(1993:	279).
 Russian anti-abortion political activism has increased after transition from state 
socialism, supported by the Russian Orthodox Church and western right to life organisations 
(Williams 1996). Nevertheless, there have not been substantial changes in abortion policy. 
In 1994, a new directive installed fees for most abortions, but in the late 1990s, abortion 
was	 still	 provided	 free	 of	 charge	 in	many	 parts	 of	 Russia	 (Flood	 2002).	 In	 2003,	 a	 new	
government decree reduced the number of reasons for abortions after 12 weeks of 
pregnancy, no longer allowing late-term abortion on social indications. The restricting 
measure	concerns	only	a	small	part	of	abortions,	since	most	are	performed	within	the	first	
12 weeks. It was defended by the Ministry of Health as an attempt to promote a switch 
from	late-term	abortions	to	safer	forms	of	birth	control	(Parfitt	2003).
 The knowledge and availability of modern contraceptives have improved and their use 
increased since the fall of state socialism. The Russian government subsidized contraceptives 
and family planning from 1992, and according to one study, modern contraceptive use 
increased by 74% and the abortion rate declined by 61% from 1988 to 2001 (Deschner & 
Cohen	2003).	Abortion	nevertheless	remains	a	common	form	of	birth	control,	and	Russia’s	
abortion rates are still among the highest in the world. It is still to be seen whether the 
decree	in	2003	is	a	first	step	towards	a	more	restrictive	attitude	to	abortion,	or	towards	more	
systematic advocacy of contraceptives instead of abortion as primary method of birth 
control.
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Poland
	 The	Polish	1932	Penal	Code	allowed	abortions	when	a	pregnancy	seriously	threatened	
a	woman’s	health,	or	when	it	resulted	from	a	criminal	offence.	From	1956,	abortion	was	to	
be	granted	on	the	basis	of	‘difficult	living	conditions’,	what	is	referred	to	more	generically	
as social indications. The law was entitled ‘On the conditions under which pregnancy 
termination	 is	 allowed’:	 Abortion	 was	 to	 be	 allowed	 under	 special	 conditions	 only.	 In	
practice	 abortion	 became	 freely	 available,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 woman	 could	 find	 a	 physician	
willing to perform the procedure (Githens 1996, Kulczycki 1999). As different from the 
preamble to the Soviet abortion law from the year before, the commentary to the Polish 
law	 did	 not	 put	 any	 significance	 on	 women’s	 right	 to	 decide	 about	 motherhood.	 On	 the	
contrary, it was explicitly stated in a commentary from the Ministry of Health, that a 
woman’s	will	was	only	 a	decisive	 factor	 as	 to	prevent	 pregnancy	–	not	 as	 to	 terminate	 it	
(Zielinska 1987).
 The 1956 law did not turn abortion into a non-contested issue. The law was repeatedly 
criticized in the following decades, especially from Catholic MPs and representatives of the 
Catholic Church. During the period of state socialism, abortion was relatively common in 
Poland	–	although	considerably	less	common	than	in	most	other	CEE	countries.	As	in	the	
USSR statistics are unreliable, but according to estimates the abortion ratios prior to 1990 
were about 75 abortions per 100 births (Kulczycki 1999). Most women who reported using 
contraception relied on traditional rhythm and withdrawal methods, not condoms, IUDs or 
hormone pills.
 After the transition from state socialism, the existing abortion law was attacked. In 
1990, the government issued new regulations that made abortion harder to obtain, including 
a required consultation of three physicians and one psychologist before an abortion, a 
conscience clause for physicians, and a fee for abortions on non-therapeutic grounds 
(Zielinska 2000, Githens 1996). These regulations were challenged before the Constitutional 
Tribunal, which upheld the regulations. In its decision, the Tribunal stressed that the 1956 
law	was	framed	in	terms	of	protecting	women’s	health,	and	thus	did	not	give	Polish	women	
any right to abortion (Zielinska 2000).
 In late 1991, the Polish Chamber of Physicians passed a new ‘Physicians Code of 
Ethics’,	permitting	abortion	only	if	the	pregnancy	was	a	threat	to	the	woman’s	health,	or	if	
it resulted from a criminal offence. Physicians who conducted abortions on social 
indications, legal under Polish law, could be stripped of their medical license by the 
Chamber	 of	 Physicians’	 disciplinary	 court.	 This	 discrepancy	 between	 national	 legislation	
and	ethical	code	for	physicians	ended	in	1993,	when	Parliament	passed	‘the	Law	on	Family	
Planning,	Legal	Protection	of	 the	Fetus	and	 the	Conditions	of	Permissibility	of	Abortion’.	
Social conditions were taken out, leaving only serious threat to health, cases of rape or 
incest and cases of foetal impairment as grounds for legal abortion. Private abortion clinics 
were	banned,	and	a	clause	on	every	human	being’s	right	to	life	from	the	time	of	conception	
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was included in the law (as signalled by the new title). Anyone providing an illegal abortion 
could go to prison under the new law, whereas a woman who obtained one would not be 
punished.
	 A	more	 leftist	Parliament	after	 the	1993	national	elections	 tried	 to	 liberalise	abortion	
legislation, but a revised law reopening for social grounds never went into effect because 
President	 Wałęsa,	 who	 was	 personally	 opposed	 to	 abortion,	 refused	 to	 sign	 it.	 A	 new	
president	 was	 elected	 in	 1995	 (Kwaśniewski),	 and	 the	 year	 after	 the	 law	 was	 changed,	
permitting abortion on social grounds as well as abortion in private clinics. The 1996 law 
also included restrictive measures, like compulsory counselling, an obligatory three-day 
waiting period, and a conscience clause for medical personnel (making abortion harder to 
obtain in practice). Opponents of the liberalised law challenged its constitutional validity, 
however,	and	the	Constitutional	Tribunal	ruled	against	abortion	on	the	basis	of	unspecified	
‘difficult	living	conditions’.	In	the	end,	the	more	restrictive	law	of	1993	was	reinstalled	in	
December	 1997.	 In	 February	 2005,	 the	 Polish	 Parliament	 rejected	 a	 proposal	 by	 the	
Democratic	 Left	Alliance	 to	 liberalise	 the	 law,	 and	 the	 1993	 law	 remains	 in	 force.	 Only	
between	 100	 and	 200	 legal	 abortions	 are	 conducted	 in	 Poland	 each	 year	 –	 that	 is,	 about	
0.05 abortions per 100 live births.
	 The	 1993	 law,	 while	 considerably	 restricting	 access	 to	 abortion,	 also	 obliged	 the	
government	to	introduce	provisions	for	people’s	free	access	to	contraception	(referred	to	as	
‘methods	and	means	for	conscious	procreation’),	assistance	during	and	after	pregnancy,	and	
sex education in schools. These provisions, meant to reduce the need for abortion, were 
never implemented. At the end of the 1990s, the Polish state still did not provide substantial 
social assistance to women with unplanned pregnancies and to single mothers, or to women 
trying to combine work and motherhood (Kulczycki 1999, Brunell 2002, Fodor et al. 2002). 
Sex education, contraceptive information and access remain scarce.
 The post-transitional political campaign against abortion largely went together with 
efforts to restrict access to contraceptives (Stloukal 1999, Zielinska 2000). Most notably, 
contraceptive pills and IUDs were spoken of as “early abortifacients”, which could be 
forbidden (Githens 1996). The use of modern contraceptives is still not widespread in 
Poland, ‘for reasons of ignorance, unfamiliarity, unwillingness to break Church edicts, 
lingering embarrassment, misinformation about their effectiveness and side-effects, and 
supply shortages’	(Kulczycki	1999:	120).
 In her analysis of arguments put forward in the abortion debate in Poland after 
transition, Fuszara concludes that ‘arguments for the absolute individual right to control 
over one’s body were infrequent and mostly used in street debates, not in Parliament’	(1993:	
246). This indicates that liberal choice discourse has not played an important part in Polish 
birth control politics, as it has in many western countries.
 The Catholic Church played a crucial role in reversing the permissive Polish abortion 
legislation. In Catholic doctrine, the distinction between abortion and contraception is one 
of degree rather than of kind. According to Kulczycki (1999), many Polish priests do not 
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make any strong moral distinction between abortion and modern contraceptives, but rather 
advocate	 that	 the	 ‘contraceptive	 mentality’	 is	 one	 of	 the	 main	 reasons	 for	 widespread	
acceptance of abortion. The Polish Church has been especially non-compromising on the 
issue of birth control, compared to in other predominantly Catholic European countries 
(except Ireland), maybe because of its special relationship to the Vatican, with the late 
Polish	Karol	Woytyła	as	Pope	John	Paul	II.	Thus,	‘For many Poles, supporting the passage 
of a legal ban on abortion became a testimony of their fidelity to the Church and to the 
Pope’s teachings’	 (Kulczycki	 1999:	 138).	The	Church	was	 also	 an	 important	 identifier	 in	
opposition to the state socialist regime, and its resistance to abortion and contraception thus 
took	on	a	wider	political	significance	(Githens	1996).
Romania
 Like Poland, Romania followed the USSR in its permissive legislation of abortion. 
From	1957,	abortion	was	to	be	provided	in	public	hospitals	on	women’s	request,	for	a	small	
fee.	 During	 the	 following	 years,	 abortion	 figures	 were	 comparatively	 high:	 300-400	
abortions per 100 live births in Romania in the early 1960s, despite one of the highest birth 
rates	in	Europe	(Zielinska	1987,	Hausleitner	1993).
 In 1966, the Ceausescu regime re-introduced restrictions on abortion. This policy 
change was part of a larger effort to stimulate population growth, which was seen as 
important	for	the	country’s	industrialisation.	Some	years	later,	Ceausescu	characterised	the	
foetus as ‘the socialist property of the whole society. Giving birth is a patriotic duty (...) 
Those who refuse to have children are deserters, escaping the law of natural continuity’	
(quoted	 in	 Harsanyi	 1993:	 46).	 Individual	 rights	 were	 not	 an	 issue	 in	 this	 pro-natalist	
discourse, and citizens were supposed to be obliged to the more important demands of the 
state (Kligman 1998).
 Romanian birth control policy became increasingly restrictive over the next two 
decades, as it became clear to the government that existing measures did not have the 
wanted effect on population growth. Modern contraceptives were not illegal, but most 
people	 had	 scarce	 knowledge	 about	 them,	 they	were	 difficult	 to	 obtain,	 or	 too	 expensive	
(Kligman 1998). From 1984, all women of reproductive age had to go through monthly 
gynaecological examinations. Those who were found to be pregnant were monitored until 
delivery, and cases of miscarriages could lead to police investigation (Flood 2002). After 
1985, abortion was legally permitted only for women over 45 years old, and for women 
who	 had	 at	 least	 five	 children	 still	 under	 their	 care.	 The	 import	 of	 contraceptives	 was	
stopped, and sterilization limited (WHO 2004). Estimated abortion rates remained high 
during the restrictive years, also compared to other CEE countries, but almost all abortions 
were illegal.
	 Among	 the	 first	 things	 that	 the	 transitional	 government	 did	 after	 the	 fall	 of	 state	
socialism in 1989, was to legalise and make abortion available on request, and to repeal 
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restrictions on contraception and sterilization. During the following years, Romania had 
high	 abortion	 ratios	 compared	 to	 elsewhere	 in	 Europe;	 in	 1990-92	 there	were	 about	 300	
abortions per 100 live births. In the next decade, the use of modern contraception increased 
and the abortion ratios dropped to about half (in 1996-99, about 160 abortions per 100 live 
births).
	 Romania’s	permissive	abortion	policy	has	not	been	significantly	challenged.	In	1996,	
new abortion legislation was enacted, allowing abortions to be performed on the pregnant 
woman’s	 request	 during	 the	 first	 14	 weeks	 of	 pregnancy,	 by	 a	 gynaecologist,	 in	 an	
authorized medical facility. These provisions were largely continued in the Reproductive 
Health Law, approved by the Romanian parliament in late 2004. This current law also 
contains provisions for and regulations of contraception and new reproductive 
technologies.
 The availability and use of modern contraception is still limited, and abortion remains 
a	primary	method	of	birth	control.	Morning	after	pills	are	difficult	to	obtain,	and	relatively	
costly: About the same price as an abortion (WHO 2004). The abortion rate has dropped 
substantially since 1989, but remains high compared to other European countries (Fodor et 
al. 2002). According to a recent assessment by the WHO, Romanian women ‘consider 
abortion to be a traditional, safe, accessible, quick, and relatively cheap procedure, even 
if unpleasant and stressful. They see abortion as a means of resolving an already existing 
unwanted pregnancy, while contraception is regarded as a less accessible, more costly and 
complicated way to prevent a possible problem (a future unwanted pregnancy)’	 (WHO	
2004: 2).
From Abortion to Contraception?
 The review of birth control policies and legislations in Russia, Poland and Romania 
shows that there have been some changes since state socialism. The development has been 
different in the three countries. In Russia and Romania, abortion is still widely practiced as 
a primary birth control method. Information on and access to contraceptives, as well as sex 
education, have improved, but there is still widespread lack of birth control knowledge in 
these two countries, and contraceptives are often expensive when available. In Poland, 
political discourse and actual policy have turned away from abortion as birth control, but 
there	 has	 not	 been	 a	 significant	 shift	 towards	 better	 access	 to	 and	 information	 about	
contraception.
	 In	 neither	 of	 the	 three	 countries	 has	 there	 been	 a	 major	 shift	 from	 abortion	 to	
contraception	as	main	form	of	birth	control	–	 the	common	pattern	 in	Western	Europe.	All	
three countries are thus different from most western European countries, where contraception 
is advocated as the main form of birth control and access to abortion defended as a 
secondary	 option,	 for	when	 contraception	 fails	 or	when	 there’s	 some	 other	 ‘good	 reason’	
why	the	woman	should	not	carry	an	unintended	and/or	unwanted	pregnancy	to	term.
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Birth Control and the State
 Politics addressing family patterns, reproduction and sexual behaviour have historically 
been important sites for states to control their populations. Different ideologies present 
different	 views	 on	 appropriate	 policies	 in	 these	 fields,	 and	 there	 are	many	 examples	 that	
states have made birth control politics a high priority. Demographic concerns have been one 
central motive, be it to increase the number of citizens (or potential workers or soldiers), 
as in USSR under Stalin and Romania under Ceausescu, or to counter over-population, as 
in	 China’s	 one-child	 policy	 and	 post-WWII	 Japan	 (Ogino,	 forthcoming).	 Other	 state	
concerns have been the relative size of different social, religious or ethnic groups, the 
relations between men and women, and the hereditary quality of the population (eugenic or 
economic motives, or both).
 Feminist movements in Western Europe and North America have put emphasis on 
rights and freedoms in these areas. Broadly speaking there have been two main orientations 
(Rudy	1996);	a	liberal,	focused	on	women’s	choices	and	right	to	privacy	when	it	comes	to	
abortion (the pro-choice movement), and a radical, focusing on social structures around 
reproduction more broadly (the reproductive rights movement). As has been stressed by 
several scholars, the birth control politics of CEE state socialist regimes were not primarily 
geared	towards	women’s	interests	–	neither	in	a	liberal	nor	in	a	radical	sense	(Fuszara	1993,	
Githens 1996, Alsop & Hockney 2001). Rather, it was state concerns with population 
development, labour market participation, or national identity that were the principal factors 
underlying CEE politics of birth control during state socialism.
 Abortion on demand thus never represented the same kind of reproductive choice in 
CEE as in Western Europe and North America, where knowledge and provision of 
contraception were widespread. In CEE, there was no well-known, easily available, 
affordable	 and	 efficient	 alternative	 to	 abortion	 (except	 from	 sexual	 abstinence)	 for	 the	
majority	 of	 women	 who	 had	 to	 combine	 family	 with	 paid	 work.	 New	 restrictions	 on	
abortion	 without	 corresponding	 significantly	 improved	 access	 to	 contraception	 could	
therefore lead to a dramatic loss of reproductive rights, as witnessed in Poland.
 The particularity of CEE birth control politics results from the way the problem was 
constructed and dealt with under state socialism. In Poland there was a strong, opposing 
discourse	from	the	Catholic	Church,	which	became	dominant	–	in	the	making	of	policy	if	
not	in	people’s	reproductive	lives	–	after	the	transition.	In	Russia	and	Romania	there	seems	
not	to	have	been	alternative	discourses	of	significant	strength.	Even	if	the	Orthodox	Church	
has voiced opposition to the existing abortion regime in Russia, it is still in the political 
margins compared to the Roman Catholic Church in Poland.
 It could possibly have been on the agenda of CEE governments to preserve or return 
to traditionalistic gender polices, by focussing on women as mothers rather than as workers. 
During state socialism, permissive abortion laws were functional to increase the female 
participation in the labour force. After transition, encouraging women to leave the work 
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force in order to provide for their families could reduce unemployment, as well as pressure 
on the state to take care of the young, the sick and the elderly. It could also be seen as a 
possible countermeasure to shrinking birth rates, as opposed to the enactment of more costly 
social provisions to encourage people to have more children, or to increased immigration.
The Categorisation into Contraception and Abortion
 In political debates and academic analyses of abortion it is often taken for granted that 
‘abortion’	 is	 something	unitary:	That	 there	 are	 different	 views	on	 the	 act,	 but	 that	 people	
nevertheless refer to the same phenomenon. Cathy Rudy has argued to the contrary that 
there is ‘no one thing accurately or adequately called “abortion.” Abortions only exist in 
the lives of concrete people in differing cultural locations. These locations, and the various 
political, religious, and ethical convictions which characterize and accompany them, 
construct different meanings and definitions for the term abortion. In these often competing 
locations, people do not all see the same act when viewing an “abortion”’	 (Rudy	 1996:	
xiii).	 Rudy’s	 point	 is	 that	 abortion	 is	 quite	 literally	 a	 different	 phenomenon	 for	 different	
people: abortion is constituted through the intersection of the contexts in which it takes 
place,	with	the	ethical	judgement	it	is	subjected	to.
	 I	 find	 this	 constructionist	 perspective	 to	 be	 a	 useful	 theoretical	 starting	 point	 for	
grasping the particularities of birth control politics in different contexts, including variations 
in core categories such as contraception and abortion. What are the problems of birth 
control, contraception and abortion represented to be in political discussions in different 
times and places? This is politically a highly relevant question, since language, 
categorisations	and	problem	definitions	are	crucial	to	how	issues	are	dealt	with.
Category Politics: Emergency Contraception, IUDs and Menstrual 
Extraction
 In the late 1990s there was some debate in Norway about the so-called morning after 
pill, a hormone dose taken orally within a few days after unprotected intercourse, to avoid 
the	 further	development	of	 an	embryo.	Was	 this	 ‘emergency	contraception’,	or	was	 it	 ‘an	
early	abortion’?	The	acceptance	and	availability	of	 this	pill	depended	on	 the	predominant	
answer to that question, which in Norway established the morning after pill as a 
contraceptive.	The	IUD	is	another	example.	Generally	this	is	spoken	of	and	classified	as	a	
contraceptive device, but technically speaking it does not prevent conception, but the further 
development of the fertilised egg (it prevents implantation in the uterus). This is something 
that has been pointed out by groups wanting to restrict access to IUDs, who have argued 
that	IUDs	represent	a	kind	of	early	abortion,	since	‘life	starts	at	conception’.
	 Another	example	 is	co-called	menstrual	 regulation/extraction.	From	 the	 late	1980s,	a	
new	‘menstrual	 regulation	procedure’	was	 introduced	 in	 the	USSR,	performed	by	vacuum	
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extraction of the uterus within 20 days of absence of menstruation. This was also referred 
to	 as	 early	 abortion	 or	 as	 ‘mini-abortion’	 (Remennick	 1993).	 The	 procedure	 is	 quite	
common in Asian Muslim states such as Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia, where 
abortion	in	the	traditional	sense	is	difficult	to	obtain	(Kulczycki	1999).
	 Similarly,	the	‘abortion	pill’	RU	486	can	be	used	to	regulate	menstruation.	Taken	every	
month, three days before the expected day of menstruation, any embryo will be extracted 
in the same way as a non-fertilised egg. According to one study, Latino immigrants in New 
York City preferred RU 486 in cases of suspected pregnancies, because, as they put it, 
abortion was against their religion (Brodie 2002). In this way they could ‘regulate 
menstruation’,	 without	 knowing	 whether	 they	 were	 actually	 pregnant	 or	 not,	 and	 thus	
bypassing moral considerations applying to abortion. The drug has been referred to as a 
‘post-coital	 contraceptive’	 and	 as	 a	 ‘fertility	 control	 drug’,	 in	 the	 latter	 case	 transcending	
the distinction between contraception and abortion.
The ‘Necessary Evil’ and the Right Choices
 Most western pro-choice politics, as well as feminist research and activism on birth 
control, are based on the idea of abortion as a necessary evil, as something that no woman 
would do easily.3） The prototypical argument is that abortion is something that a pregnant 
woman will only undertake if there are no other (good) options. In other words, no rational 
woman	would	‘use	abortion	as	contraception’.	The	argument	for	choice	presumes	that	 the	
pregnancy	 is	 unintended	 and/or	 unwanted,	 and	 that	 to	 give	 birth	 would	 cause	 social	 or	
psychological damage or at least hardship.
 This necessary evil framework has had a considerable political potency, in its non-
challenge of culturally dominant notions about gender and family. It implies that a woman 
who has an abortion does not make a choice against motherhood as such, but against a kind 
of hardship that would follow from the birth of a particular child. The more radical issue 
of	pregnant	women	choosing	not	to	become	mothers,	also	if	they	haven’t	used	contraceptives	
or	 aren’t	 in	 a	 desperate	 situation	 of	 some	 kind,	 is	 thus	 sidestepped	 (‘desperate	 situation’	
being, however, a highly relative notion in this context). One might therefore interpret the 
current pro-choice framework as partly a result of a necessary adaptation to the political 
realities when abortion on demand came onto the political agenda. To rally enough support 
for	liberal	laws,	it	was	strategic	to	pursue	a	pragmatic	argument	of	‘necessary	evil’	and	to	
focus on the clear-cut cases: Women who were in desperate need for abortion, and who 
would therefore, if she could not have a legal one, have an illegal abortion instead of giving 
birth.
 There is, however, a contradiction inherent in the necessary evil framework on choice, 
　） For exeptions from this general pro-choice tendency to see abortion as a necessary evil, see Luker (1975) 
and Hadley (1996).
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in the sense that it provides a political rhetoric that is at odds with its political solution: 
abortion	on	demand.	The	choice	rhetoric	is	qualified,	in	the	sense	that	the	argument	about	
women’s	 right	 to	 choose	 it	 is	 based	 upon	 implicit	 assumptions	 about	 what	 legitimate	
abortion motives are, and what the right choice in a given situation should be. According 
to these assumptions, when a woman is pregnant, abortion is a legitimate option only in the 
presence	of	special	circumstance	(like	e.g.	failed	contraception,	socio-economic	difficulties,	
psychological	 distress,	 or	 a	 ‘father	 problem’).	An	 unwanted	 pregnancy	 tout court is not 
enough.	Qualified	abortion	choice	rhetoric	becomes	problematic	in	cases	where	such	special	
circumstances lack, e.g. for abortion based on foetal sex, on minor foetal irregularities, or 
on other motives not considered legitimate or serious enough to end a pregnancy (like 
holiday plans).
 Paradoxically, there is hardly any possibility of a real choice in the choice rhetoric 
around	abortion:	Either	a	woman	has	an	abortion	because	‘she	has	to’,	due	to	some	serious	
circumstances (and there is thus no real choice), or she will carry the pregnancy to term, 
because she has no acceptable reason not to. Women who choose to have an abortion 
without	any	more	specific	or	dramatic	 reason	 than	not	wanting	 to	become	a	mother,	have	
no	place	in	this	problematisation	–	they	are	non-existent,	in	a	discursive	sense.
 This is different from the way contraception is understood in Western Europe (with a 
few	exceptions,	of	which	Ireland	is	the	most	notable),	as	a	non-qualified,	legitimate	way	to	
avoid	 childbirth	 –	 without	 further	 reasons	 given.	 Using	 contraception	 is	 in	 fact	 not	 only	
seen	 as	 legitimate,	 but	 commonly	 also	 seen	 as	 ‘responsible’	 and	 thus	 as	 normatively	
prescribed (e.g. outside of marriage, in casual sexual relations, in young age, during 
education, or when pregnancy and childbirth is not an intended motive for engaging in 
heterosexual	intercourse).	This	is	also	the	case	for	‘emergency	contraception’,	although,	as	
indicated	by	the	out-of-the-ordinary	modifier,	 this	 is	 regarded	as	a	more	problematic	form	
of contraception.
Selective Abortions and Qualified Choice Rhetoric
	 The	paradoxes	of	abortion	on	demand	based	on	a	qualified	choice	rhetoric	has	revealed	
itself in Norwegian birth control debates since the early 1990s, around the issue of selective 
abortion	 –	 abortion	 due	 to	 some	 (suspected	 or	 confirmed)	 abnormality	 or	 disease	 in	 the	
individual foetus. As new reproductive technologies and genetic tests have made it possible 
to say much more than before about the characteristics of a foetus (or even a fertilized egg), 
a discussion has opened around what kind of conditions may be legitimate reasons for 
abortion. Many of those restrictive to abortion in general have also been against selective 
abortion. More interestingly, politicians from the left, in favour of the current abortion on 
demand legislation, have voiced concerns about the possibility that women could terminate 
their	pregnancies	on	the	basis	of	some	‘minor’	foetal	defect,	or	no	defect	at	all	(like	being	
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female).4）
 In my view, the concern that women could abort for the wrong reasons, shows implicit 
normative	presuppositions	in	the	support	for	women’s	‘free	choice’,	that	may	turn	the	pro-
choice position contradictory, or at least paradoxical, in the face of external developments 
(like new techniques for identifying characteristics of individual foetuses, or improved 
living conditions for unwed mothers). As Dorothy McBride has pointed out, it is problematic 
to support abortion on demand for all women, without accepting that some women will then 
abort	for	‘what	may	be	perceived	of	as	selfish	and	possibly	unethical	reasons’,	like	disability	
or	sex	(Stetson	1996).	In	fact,	this	is	where	qualified	choice	rhetoric	with	its	necessary	evil	
legitimising strategy can lead; to a liberal rhetoric of free choice that is moralised, and 
sometimes at odds with itself.
Pro-Choice Politics beyond the Normative Contraception/Abortion 
Distinction?
 The distinction in Western Europe between contraception as responsible and abortion 
as an evil (necessary or not) is of relatively recent date. During birth control politics of the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, these two categories were in general treated much alike 
in moral as well as in legal terms. In Norway for example, criminalising abortion went 
together with criminalising advertising for and giving information about contraceptives. 
Rules against spreading knowledge about contraceptives and against making them available 
were	abandoned	on	a	judicial	level	in	1927,	but	state-initiated	advocacy	for	and	information	
about contraception was politically controversial well into the 1970s. There were differences 
in degree regarding opposition to abortion and contraception, but there was no qualitative 
difference like today. By those opposed to more information and permissiveness, the two 
were	both	associated	with	promiscuity	and/or	sex	for	non-procreative	purposes.
 Kristin Luker, in a study of birth control attitudes and behaviours among Californian 
women	 around	 1970,	 shows	 how	 the	 distinction	 may	 operate	 in	 people’s	 day-to-day	
reproductive choices. In Taking Chances: Abortion and the Decision not to Contracept, 
Luker argues that the construction of contraception as a responsible and abortion as an 
irresponsible	 form	 of	 birth	 control,	 does	 not	 resonate	 with	 people’s	 lived	 experiences.	
According to this construction, contraceptives would and should normally be preferred to 
abortion, which women only see, or should see, as a last resort. But, according to Luker, 
‘Californian women seem to be making a de facto choice of abortion as a method of fertility 
control’	 (Luker	 1975:	 10).	 She	 finds	 that	women	 deliberately	 ‘take	 chances’	 in	 not	 using	
contraceptives.
	 Luker’s	explanation	to	this	finding	is	 that	 the	costs	(in	a	broad	sense)	of	abortion	are	
not necessarily perceived as higher than the costs of contraception. Many women experience 
　） See Stenvoll (2002) for a discussion of Norwegian political debates on selective abortion.
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abortion as relatively unproblematic, and there are also costs of using contraceptives that 
are often down-played or ignored in public discourse. For women this includes 
acknowledging being sexually active, or being sexually available, or being pragmatic (not 
romantic) about sex. Other costs are loss of spontaneity, the costs of obtaining contraceptives 
(seeing a doctor as well as paying for them), negative male attitudes to condoms, biological 
side effects of hormone-based contraceptives (like weight gain), etc. Most of these costs 
are immediate, as opposed to the more uncertain future costs of an unwanted pregnancy. In 
addition	 there	 are	 some	 possible	 benefits	 of	 becoming	 pregnant,	 also	 without	 it	 being	
planned.	For	instance,	it	proves	that	you	are	fertile,	it	may	be	a	test	of	a	man’s	commitment	
(will he marry?), and it could add to the erotic thrill.
 Not using contraceptives, or using abortion as birth control, should therefore not in 
itself	be	characterized	as	irresponsible	or	irrational.	Luker’s	analysis	is	important,	because	
it shows some of the complexity with which women deal with birth control, also across the 
contraception/abortion	 distinction.	 It	 points	 to	 a	 possible	 normative	 basis	 for	 pro-choice	
rhetoric	 that	 transcends	 the	–	 in	my	view	–	problematic	notion	of	abortion	as	a	necessary	
evil. The following passage from an early 1970s article on contraception and abortion 
illustrates the possibly rich connections between the two: ‘There are several possible life 
patterns which the individual woman may follow: no contraception, no abortion; regular 
contraceptive practice, and accidental pregnancies carried to term; regular contraceptive 
practice, abortion used to terminate accidental pregnancies; initial use of contraception, 
then a change to reliance on abortion; one or more abortions, then a change to reliance 
on contraception; continuous reliance on abortion alone; sporadic reliance on either or 
both methods combined ’	 (Moore	1971:	131).	A	public	policy	based	on	a	qualified	choice	
rhetoric,	that	does	not	allow	for	more	than	the	second	and	third	of	these	‘life	patterns’,	may	
therefore be criticised for not addressing the realities of individual women (and men) 
dealing with birth control.
Conclusions
 It is striking how differently contraception and abortion has been understood in CEE 
compared to Western Europe. The main points made in this article are that abortion grew 
into the main form of birth control from the mid-1950s, and that modern contraception was 
either ignored or actively opposed. After transition abortion rates have declined somewhat, 
and contraception use increased, but most CEE countries still have high abortion rates 
compared	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	world.	An	exception	 is	Poland,	where	 the	 strong	 influence	of	
the	Catholic	Church	resulted	in	a	near-ban	on	all	abortions,	without	any	significant	increase	
in information about or access to contraception.
	 The	article	also	addresses	different	problematisations	of	birth	control,	more	specifically	
the dominating normative distinction in Western Europe between contraception and 
abortion.	This	distinction	 is	not	 ‘natural’,	but	produced	 in	different	national	and	historical	
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context,	and	I	have	shown	examples	of	‘category	politics’,	meaning	discussions	on	whether	
a particular phenomenon or technique (e.g. morning after pills or menstrual extraction) 
should be categorized as one or the other. Moreover, I have argued that choice rhetoric in 
abortion	 debates	 is	 often	 implicitly	 qualified,	 causing	 some	 tensions	 or	 paradoxes	 when	
women	seem	 to	be	making	 ‘the	wrong	choices’	 about	abortion.	Finally,	 I	have	pointed	 to	
an alternative foundation of pro-choice rhetoric, not based on the abortion as necessary evil 
framework, with its normative presuppositions that constructs the non-use of contraception, 
or	‘using	abortion	as	contraception’,	as	irresponsible	or	irrational.
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